*On the ‘Undivided Continuity of States’.—’intuition’ in Bergson & Nietzsche…

*(follows on from ‘Intuition, Flux, & Anti-metaphysics’…).

*On the Undivided Continuity of States. …
—on the ‘primal unity’ &(/as)—‘duration’…

—‘analysis’ & ‘duration’.
(—Bergson & ‘On Truth’…).

 

 *In An Introduction to Metaphysics (of 1903), Henri Bergson offers a clear, concise, and apt summary of the distinction between ‘analysis’ (—the conceptual) and ‘intuition’, which he had established in his earlier works (Time and Free Will,—Matter and Memory, (etc.)…)…—

By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects.[1]

so,…

—‘analysis,’ Bergson argues, breaks its object down into parts (—‘elements’) corresponding to pre-existing concepts in which it participates (is made to participate) with other objects. …

*—it strikes me that these terms very closely echo—perhaps in a way not identified before and most certainly not dwelt upon in work on the similarities between Nietzsche and Bergson—Nietzsche’s critique of language, the intellect, and the conceptual in ‘On Truth’, and, in particular here, Nietzsche’s critique of the formation of the ‘Platonic’ concept of the ‘leaf’, which was formed, he argued, by discarding the differences between individual leaves: the awakening of the ‘idea’ that, ‘in addition to the leaves’, there exists in ‘nature’—‘the leaf’.’[2]

—(the process of) ‘analysis’, then, reduces the thing (—its object) to these constituent elements and to their conceptual correspondences.

—by contrast, Bergson wishes to promote the method of ‘intuition,’ which—as it did for Nietzsche in ‘On Truth’—aims to shatter the reduction of its object to pre-existing conceptual prejudices, and to place the observer back into (in closer proximity to) an original state of disinterested, non-conceptual receptivity *(—‘intellectual sympathy’). …

… —in terms which I will argue echo Nietzsche’s appropriation of Schopenhauer’s principle of individuation (principium individuationis) in Birth, beneath the hardened veneer of the fragmented and atomised spatio-temporal realm of the concepts—the ‘crust solidified on the surface’ of experience (cf. Bergson, IM, 25)—Bergson identifies ‘one reality […] which we all seize from within, by intuition and not simply by analysis. It is our own personality in its flowing through time—our self which endures.’ (24) …

—Beneath the artificially differentiated, atomistic experience of things in conceptual space, and of moments in conceptual time, Bergson argues, subsists a foundation of undifferentiated states which he calls *‘duration’ (—durée):

‘beneath these sharply cut crystals and this frozen surface, a continuous flux which is not comparable to any flux I have ever seen. There is a succession of states, each of which announces that which follows and contains that which precedes it.’ (25)

—Duration constitutes ‘one reality,’ seemingly paradoxically comprised of a continual flux of successive ‘states’. …

We are originally made aware of this flux, according to Bergson, through our consciousness of our own personality (internal intuition) and (then, subsequently) extend the principle to the outer phenomena of perception (external intuition).

—apparently autonomous, these… states nonetheless interpenetrate, containing all those states which precede them and unfolding ineluctably into all those which are to follow.

The ‘states’ of duration constitute neither a simple multiplicity, nor a simple unity, but, ‘instead of being distinct, as they are in any other [comparable form of] multiplicity, encroach upon one another.’ (30)—They constitute ‘a continuity of elements which prolong themselves into one another’,—a continuity which ‘participates in unity as much as in multiplicity; but this moving, changing, colored, living unity has hardly anything in common with the abstract, motionless, and empty unity which the concept of pure unity circumscribes.’(30-31)[3]

*—the flux of duration represents an undivided continuity of states’. …

It is the undivided continuity of this flux which the concepts rend asunder through the imposition of artistically projected individuated forms:

Pure intuition, external or internal, is that of an undivided continuity. We break up this continuity in the one case to distinct words, in the other to independent objects. But, just because we have thus broken the unity of our original intuition, we feel ourselves obliged to establish between the served terms a bond which can only be external and superadded.[4]

The concepts are generated through the formation and false hypostatisation of words (an echo of the formation of language in ‘On Truth’) and of independent objects. Once fragmented, for any form of discourse to be possible, it becomes necessary, Bergson argues, to artificially form bonds between the severed entities. This is the role of ‘analysis’. (—cf. CE, 4)

For Bergson, these bonds, whatever their use value (for language and for action), can in no way afford access to the underlying flux, but are, and must remain, external epiphenomena.

(and, again,—this echoes Nietzsche’s critique of the conceptual quasi-Platonic prostheses to experience in ‘On Truth’…).

 

*the ‘Limits of the diaphane’. …
—on the fragments in-of space & the atoms in-of time.

 

Ineluctable modality of the visible: at least that if no more, thought through my eyes. Signatures of all things I am here to read, seapspawn and seawrack, the nearing tide, that rusty boot. Snotgreen, bluesilver, rust: coloured signs. Limits of the diaphane.

*(—Joyce, Ulysses, ed. Seamus Deane (London: Penguin, 1992).
—‘Proteus’, 45).

Bergson, then, is concerned with the limits of perception. …

*… (that is)—with the limits of what can be perceived—and be known—within or through the constraints of language and of the intellect,…

—his critique of ‘analysis’ and of the concepts of the intellect, echoes Nietzsche’s sarcastic ‘fable’ on the conceit of the intellect, in ‘On Truth’. … —

how miserable, how shadowy and transient, how aimless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature. There were eternities during which it did not exist. And when it is all over with the human intellect, nothing will have happened. For this intellect has no additional mission which would lead it beyond human life. (114)

*Bergson’s key concern, of course, is time, and, in particular, the occlusion of the flux of duration in the formation of our conceptual experience of time. …

—of all that is, in essence, lost in-of time in the formation of the atoms of—(everyday) ‘clock-time’. …

—Bergson is concerned primarily with the nature of the perception of time, and, by extension, the effect of this on the perception of things in time.

*in order to—(what?)… —to unpack all that I think is at stake in Bergson’s conception of time, and thus, of course, by the terms of the parallel I’ve established, in Nietzsche’s,—I want to perform a sort of an experiment here. …

*—I want to read two short films, posted online, on the YouTube channel of *THE SLOW MO GUYS,—Gavin Free and Dan Gruchy. …

as the name suggests—Free, with the assistance of Gruchy, films often banal-everyday phenomena in slow motion using a high-definition Phantom Flex high-speed digital camera…

—their introductions to their films, choices of subject—and the channel itself—all have an irreverent, mock-juvenile charm, and yet they’re surprisingly… —beautiful,… awe-inspiring, and moving… (helped in no small part by the score which accompanies the… drop (—the fall (sic.—for want) into the slow-motion sequences). …

*in particular here, I’m interested in how little (of the world) we actually see (perceive). *(that is,—how little is seen. …). …

—how the detail—the qualities—of *(apparently) whole-discrete, persisting things, changes, and the (what?)… —the elevation (sic) of the (again,—apparently) banal,—dull,… —known, to (the status of)—the *sublime (I suppose) in an alteration in-to the perception of time.

*—I want to focus on two films: ‘Molotov Cocktail in Slow Motion’, and ‘Paint Exploding at 15,000fps’

(though I also recommend, particularly: ‘Exploding Lighters in Slow Motion’, ‘Popping Popcorn in super Slow Motion’, and ‘Paint on a Speaker at 2500fps’…).

*(and so, then. … —a note-disclaimer: …

—all this will have been-is meant, in a sense, to be read alongside those video-posts themselves). …

 

 

*—on ‘Molotov Cocktails in Slow Motion’:

*in time as seen in (-of) the everyday (—perceived). …

—(only ever seen as) a (sudden) burst. …

—a flash. (—of light). …

—the fire. moves—like liquid. (water).—spreads-unfolds like a molten wave (—waves).—points,—channels(-cones) (from the core.—blossoming back in bursting plumes.—into themselves…). spreads, in a burst.—swells. (throbs-pulses melting-clouded).—billows. … (and rolls).—dark (in-at the core).—undulates… to bright (a light yellow-white) at the edges (crest.—the cusp) of waves—through deep (dark) (earthy) orange. …

—can see it. in… forms (separate) shapes. elements. … *(—not seen in the fast quotidian.—(absorbed.—lost in a) flash).

and moves in (isolated,—overlapping) waves… —folds. (creased). … —back-in-through itself.

and—darkens (not sudden.—no-not fades…). *—moves from-through light (bright, electric, intense) to dark (cloudy-molten), before exhausting. …

—takes on the form (as it consumes) of the liquid burning (—as it moves)… *(—not separate: a liquid that then burns-is burning.—a simultaneity-continuity (of liquid–flame) undifferentiated. …). (melts). undulates. aqueous.

beautiful (—stunning …).

*on ‘Paint Exploding at 15,000fps’. …

. —yellow, orange, red,—blue, green, purple. (small bottles.—ranged in a rack)…

(with fire-crackers.—to explode. in a row—a sequence…).

yellow.

—paint spurts. in curling lines and tendrils (drops), then rises,—in a ribbon (flowing in undulat waves.—like fabric.—a viscous membrane).—in (slow, heavy) folds (and creases)—tears at the edges.—up.—into a… cloud (of particles). (—a shape (—ragged)). breaking(-ripped).

and continues (flows)… —distends… —into a thinner ribbon (narrow). and lights (from withinside) with a bright, hot light (of fire—bursting (intense)…).—in bright pulses. with small light sparks. (light seems to darken-dull the paint’s colour). …

and shoots off (tears), into sharp line-ribboned tendrils. …

*(the bottles fall…).

red.

explodes.

bright white ragged light (—to yellow). with (viscous) rays and ribbons (—rivulets) of (deep, dark) red…

(—carried. out. on the crest (the cusp) of the wave—riding-bursting out—of light (—pushed-forced)…).

—and droplets (thick). …

(—lit by the fire, burning—pink-orange. …).

—light tears-shatters into (burning) fragment-pieces.

—the… fabric of the paint tears (from withinside).—torn membrane (pieces). (shapes—sharp-edged)…

still white burning droplets. …

and twisting globules—out. ….

expands (and disappears). …

and blue.

bursts.—a spurt.—a jet. (of tendrils-droplets). …

—a plume of hot light folded into.

(white burning spark-droplets)—fizzles. …

green.

explodes. … out.—into-in two (thin) dark arcing waves (folding over into themselves—pleated. curved (—a crease).). undulat (—distend). unfolding (roll). …

bright core of (electric seeming—generat) white light (intense). in liquid-fabric (viscous membrane) waves (a film (skin).—surging plumes)…

and tear. … —into ragged liquid membrane limbs-tendrils (a star—shaped). …

(—linked by tenuous tenril-ribbons—strands.

—heavy mass at the explosion’s crest (outmost).

—traces the circle (the ring) of the wave. …).

and tear (fly off) (—a release). (dissipation). …

purple.

in a pulse. spits.—forces out the white, electric glowing burst of burning.

(electric droplets. spray—like sparks)…

—a jet (thick) thin (—a slicing line)…

orange.

explodes.—in a heavy, thin, curling (torn) ribbon. …

*(a new line (of bottles)… —purple, orange, blue, yellow, green, red. (—ranged in a rack).).

 

purple.

small pulse of liquid. burst.

shower of spark-droplets. …

(a burst of electric light—white, through yellow-pale to darker (heavier) orange.—at its heart (in-at the bottle’s neck).

light in purple, in-at the bottle-top. …

—plume of dark paint (long.—thin)…

orange.

a burst, more substantial

(shot through with globules of white, hot light).

—a taller, thicker plume (stretched-distended.—creasing…).

blue.

erupts. … —ringed cloud-fringe pleated—a wave (heavy, dark).—thick tapering plume (creased-folded) above.

—around a bright, intense burst of white electric light… (—a shower of orange-yellow sparks) explodes out (—a ring)…

yellow.

burst. dark, thick, voluminous folds of fabric-liquid (viscous skin-membrane). tapering.

wide burst spread of hot, yellow (electric) light behind-beneath. …

bursts of sparks-droplets…

…—erupts and tears apart to fibrous tendrils…

(flashes—spherical bursts of light through).

green.

erupts.

—a thin ring (tendrilled)—the crest-event horizon (cusp) of a heavy (viscous) wave (waves.—billow heavy).

bright, sharp, hot core of light (white.—fades-darkens to deep yellow at its leading-cooling edge). …

sharp, thin, twisting-winding plume.—rises to (creased) tearing billow…

and… —evaporates (seems) in-to tiny sparks.

—a thick, jagged plume (falls-collapses). …

red.

vaporous eruption (—a cloud) around a hot, bright core (intense) of white light—obscured by torn fragments-rags of viscous.

—sharp, narrow plume tapers (above—over)…

—showers out.—in-to droplets-sparks…

and—leaves a thick winding plume…

—shoots upward (thinning,—exhausting).

and falls (a fibre-tendril—thread). …

*time.

(hmm.).

*and, so,—what is shown in time (as-slowed), then—? …

*—‘time’ as-is-seen (in the) everyday *(—broken. atomic.—measured…)… —is not, then, time (as-it-is-in) itself. …

*(—there is no time as-it-is-in itself. …).

—an alteration (alterations) in-within the perception of time (—SLOW. MO. …) reveals the arbitrariness,… —the *stupidity,—the limitlimits (limited) of ‘clock-time’ (quotidian), and the potential (—the necessity—?) of-for the retrieval of new forms from a broader (—(slightly) more comprehensive) perception (sensitivity toward-comprehension of) flux. (—behind.—beneath). …

—what we perceive—we read—as discrete things (quanta), then, (in space,—in-through-of time),… —what appear as phenomena-things,—whole, solid, discrete, (clearly) delineated… —known,… —break down, in-within time-as-slowed (drawn out, unpacked,—extended…).

(or, no,… rather: —shown never to have been the solid-known-discretions (quanta) had been taken for…).

—revealed in time-slowed as the playing out of the processes of forces-elements (—themselves can be broken down (—in infinite divisibility)…). …

—reveals qualities which (had) always inhered (sic. —were always present), but never seen (cognised) (before). …

—far more beautiful than (in) the crude unit-atoms of everyday ‘clock-time’, which are, otherwise, all that is available…

*time-slowed, then… —undoes the prejudices (conceptual) of-in time (—as thought was known). …

and closer, then,—to the continuity of interpenetrating states beneath-behind the fragments of space in-through the atoms of time, forged by the intellect (—‘analysis’),—in-from language (from words and-to concepts)…

*and this—the shattering of prejudices-conceptual (of habit-inertia)—is what, for Bergson, as it had been for Nietzsche, is at stake in ‘intuition’ (—vs. the concepts of the intellect)—as method. …

*on ‘intuition’, then,—as method. …

*Bertrand Russell very beautifully summarises what he (rightly.—why not?) calls Bergson’s ‘ingenious’ conception of the intellect and his conceptions of ‘matter’ and of ‘time’. … —

Intelligence or intellect, “as it leaves the hands of nature, has for its chief object the inorganic solid”; it can only form a clear idea of the discontinuous and immobile; its concepts are outside each other like objects in space, and have the same stability. The intellect separates in space and fixes in time; it is not made to think evolution, but to represent becoming as a series of states [. …] Solid bodies, it would seem, are something which mind has created on purpose to apply the intellect to them.

[…]

The genesis of intellect and the genesis of material bodies, we are told, are correlative; both have been developed by reciprocal adaptation. “An identical process must have cut out matter and the intellect, at the same time, from a stuff that contained both.”[5]

*—‘matter’, then (—so-called),—as a product-creation of the intellect. … —as that which falls away from duration—from-through its own inertia. …

(—frozen-carved (away.—‘Solid bodies’) from duration, in order that the intellect—that the subject (as subject) be able to function at all…).

*(and this is the same for good ol’ Fritz, I think. …

*—‘matter’,—the subject (—the ‘I’-the ‘self’),—the body (as whole-discrete)… (again)—creations of the intellect—as all that which falls away from flux. …).

indeed.

*though, to my mind, he offers what is still by far one of the most sharp and clear readings of Bergson, Russell, I think, is mistaken in the charges of ‘irrationalism’ and the anti-intellectualism, which he lays against him.[6]

Russell is too dismissive and too reductive. …

—this is a point that I want to return to when discussing readings (and misreadings) of Nietzsche’s relationship to Romanticism in my own reading of The Birth of Tragedy (in a later chapter-fragments), but… what I want to do here is this

—I think Russell’s charge of ‘irrationalism’ represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the terms of Bergson’s critique of the intellect, but in a way which is actually genuinely useful to me here and illuminating for my reading of Nietzsche…

*for Bergson, as for Nietzsche… —we are (all of us) trapped in language.—locked. in (within) the inadequacies—the limits—of language… *—of the fragments (of things) in space,… —in the atoms (in-)of ‘time. …

—for both, there can be no —complacency in (with regard to) language. …

—there must, for both, by contrast, be always a (fundamental) wariness-mistrust

*(—of the ability-capacity to ever truly say (have said) anything).

—no,… sitting still in the arbitrary, illusory, inadequate and ineluctably failing quanta (in-) of language. …

language.—as something entered into,… —not (never) as something possessed. …

(—something (sic) thrust into (into which, then, we are thrust). unavoidably.—in-volun-tarily but—necessarily. …). …

‘analysis’ (—the intellect) rends asunder the flux of the continuity of ‘states’.

*—just as for Nietzsche, in his account of the origins of language in ‘On Truth’, for Bergson language emerges as a process of metaphorical transposition:

*—from the original (sense) stimulus, through the word (—the sound), in-to the abstract concept. …

*—T.E. Hulme, in his essays-articles on Bergson’s philosophy, argues that these metaphors ‘soon run their course and die. But it is necessary to remember that when they were first used by the poets who created them they were used for the purpose of conveying over a vividly felt actual sensation.’[7]

Just as for Nietzsche, for Hulme (following Bergson) language originally emerges from a need to articulate a vividly felt sensible stimulus—an internal or external ‘intuition’. …

When this initial stimulus and artistic projection have passed, the metaphor (the word) can then, itself pass into popular usage (—becomes a concept). …

—It becomes hypostatised and its artistic origins are forgotten….

—The metaphor reaches the end of its capacity to articulate the ‘vividly felt actual sensation’ and becomes a mere ‘counter,’ akin to the pieces in a game of chequers, to be manipulated (‘moved about’) according to the demands of practical utility.[8]

*For Bergson, the aim of intuition as method is to ‘recover [the] contact with the real,’ severed in the formation of concepts and of ‘analysis,’ and to ‘restore intuition to its original purity’.[9]

Echoing Nietzsche’s claim for the necessity of the redemption of the intellect through ‘forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of concepts’ (in ‘On Truth’), Bergson argues that intuition is ‘only truly itself when it goes beyond the concept, or at least when it frees itself from rigid and ready-made concepts in order to create a kind very different from those which we habitually use.’ (Bergson, IM, 30)

—The aim of intuition, then, is, by an ‘effort,’ to break through the artificial surface of the conceptual and regain the undivided continuity of flux (duration) and what Bergson dubs ‘the intention of life’: —‘the simple movement that runs through the lines, that binds them together and gives them significance.’[10]

Bergson, and Hulme following him, dub this the *‘aesthetic intuition’, and both view art as the paragon of the attempt to lacerate the conceptual and to bring back new forms (new language, new metaphors, new images and new concepts) from the flux of duration—an (ironic) re-birth and appropriation of the intellect

*importantly, then… —rather than a form of straightforward ‘irrationalism’ or anti-intellectualism, as Russell’s reading would suggest—intuition, then, *(as method), represents an attempt (perhaps invariably ill-fated.—inevitably fails-failing), to appropriate the process of the formation of language and the concepts—the intellect (—‘analysis’).—from in-within. *—in the laceration and return. —and to revivify. …

(—to revivify language—the concepts of the intellect—and to turn to account. …): …

*—‘This intention is just what the artist tries to regain in placing himself back within the object by a kind of sympathy and breaking down by an effort of intuition the barrier that space puts between him and his model.’ (CE, 177).[11]

For Bergson, as for Nietzsche, the aim of intuition is to overcome the institutionalised and complacent metaphysical prejudice of the concepts and to create new metaphors to in order to capture the ‘vividly felt actual sensation’.

The flux of the undivided continuity of states subsisting beneath the veneer of the individuated concepts of the intellect in Bergson’s conception of ‘duration’ and ‘intuition’ is what is at stake in Nietzsche’s analogous critique of the intellect and championing of ‘intuition’ in ‘On Truth’.

For both Nietzsche and Bergson, the laceration of the concepts of the intellect in ‘intuition’ leads to a descent into the pre-individuated, undifferentiated flux, and a return with new metaphors and previously ‘unheard-of combinations of concepts.’

*and so,… —

In essence, I want to argue that the terms of the opposition of ‘intuition’ to the intellect, rendered explicit in ‘On Truth’, are (already, implicitly) at stake in his contrast of ‘the immediate certainty of vision’ (—the ‘intensely clear figures’ of the gods), to ‘logical inference’ and ‘concepts’ in the opening gambit and establishment of the terms of the argument of Birth.

—The laceration of the falsely hypostatised, individuated concepts of the intellect and descent into the flux of the undivided continuity of states of ‘On Truth’ (illuminated through the Bergsonian parallel), is what is ultimately at stake in the relationship of the Apollinian and Dionysian artistic drives and the ‘primal unity’ of Birth and, as I will argue forms the foundation of Nietzsche’s account of artistic inspiration in the text. …

*In Birth, Nietzsche argues that we should ‘not consider the question of our own “reality”’, but instead ‘conceive of our empirical existence, and that of the world in general, as a continuously manifested representation of the primal unity’. (§4, 45)

Nietzsche argues that the empirical existence of the individual and the world which they inhabit are to be conceived of as artistically projected representations, forged from the underlying undifferentiated flux of the ‘primal unity’. This is thus analogous to his later account of the formation of words and concepts and the sculpting of the ‘thing’ from the underlying flux of the undivided continuity of states in ‘On Truth’ and, as I have argued, this latter must be understood in the light of Nietzsche’s refutation of the thing-in-itself (the thing = x) in the essay, and his contrast of ‘dark contradictoriness’ to the metaphysical ‘unity’ of Schopenhauer’s ‘will’, as the thing-in-itself, in ‘On Schopenhauer’.

As Crawford argues, the ‘primal unity’ remains firmly on the side of representation, prior to the imposition of the artistically projected individuated forms of the concepts. For Nietzsche, in Birth, whatever the stammering he is led into by his awkward adherence to Schopenhauerian and Kantian (metaphysical) ‘formulas’, there can be no access to the thing-in-itself, already discredited in the earlier, unpublished fragment and re-emphasised in the later essay. (—see ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’, 20, 24)

*—the ‘primal unity’ of Birth represents the ‘eternally suffering and contradictory’ interpenetrating flux of natural drives. (§4, 45)


[1] Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics (hereafter, IM), trans. T.E. Hulme (Cambridge: Hackett, 1999), 23-24

[2] ‘OTL,’ 117.

*—on this, see the previous post on *early Nietzsche—vs. Schopenhauerian metaphysics. …

[3] Cf. Bergson, Creative Evolution (hereafter CE), trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1998), 1-7

[4] Bergson, Matter and Memory (MM), trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (London: Swan Sonnenchein & Co., Ltd, 1911), 239

[5] Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1961), 758.

[6] see Russell, 756 and 762, respectively…

[7] T.E. Hulme, ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art,’ in Speculations: Essays on Humanism and the Philosophy of Art, ed. Herbert Read, with a Frontispiece and Foreword by Jacob Epstein (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1924), 141-169 (151).

[8] Cf. Hulme, ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art,’ 151-152, 159-162, 165-166 and ‘The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds,’ 176. The metaphor is also crucial to the notes gathered together under the title of ‘Cinders,’ 215-245.

[9] MM, 241. Cf. Gille Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 13-35 (esp. 14), and Suzanne Guerlac, Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 63-64: ‘This is what Bergson is trying to do: to bring to philosophical awareness what has been absolutely repressed by thought and is structurally inaccessible to it’. (63)

[10] CE, 176-177. Cf. IM, 21-22 and Hulme, ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art,’ 144 where the passage is reproduced verbatim.

[11] Cf. Hulme, 144. Hulme goes on to refer to the artist’s shattering of the conceptual and experience of flux as the ‘essentially aesthetic emotion’ (145). Cf. also 149-150 and 161-162.

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4 thoughts on “*On the ‘Undivided Continuity of States’.—’intuition’ in Bergson & Nietzsche…

  1. […] Nietzsche’s treatment of these questions in particular to the philosophy of Henri Bergson: … Bergson’s conception of language and/as the fiction of fixity in space and in-of time, the flux of… […]

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