*—toward the concept of a disruptive, anti-transcendental ‘classicism’. (‘*on the Becoming Actual of the Being of Beauty’ part (iii). & ‘*a paean’ part (ii). …)

*(follows on from ‘from the epiphany to the esthetic image’, ‘a paean’, & ‘*on the ‘image’.—vs. Platonic ressentiment.  …).

 

*—toward the concept of a disruptive, anti-transcendental ‘classicism’.
(—a paean. part (ii). …
—an… amalgamation, of sorts, of all of the gone before…).

 

So. …

 

*In the previous chapter-fragment, I argued that Stephen’s aesthetic theory in Portrait opposes the *image to a conception of art which grants the artist (turned… privileged visionary) and, subsequently, the artwork, a form of access to the transcendental realm (so to) of the (‘Platonic’) Ideas (which I argued was exemplified in Yeats’s early critical writing, and especially in his definition of transcendental Symbolism). …

 

 

At the end of the chapter, I tied this to my reading of the evolution of the concept of the ‘epiphany’ (in-of Stephen Hero) into that of the ‘image’ in Portrait

 

—I suggested that the latter refines the terms of the former, bringing out (or rendering explicit) the—implicit—a-religious anti-metaphysics at stake within it, and incorporates the opposition of the ‘classical’ and ‘romantic’ artistic ‘tempers’ of Stephen’s ‘Art and Life’ paper in Stephen Hero (and in-of Joyce’s own early critical writing).

 

 

*—In ‘Intuition, Flux and Anti-metaphysics’, in discussing Nietzsche’s early rejection of Schopenhauerian metaphysics, I’ve already gone some way to outlining the transcendental (the a priori) in (for) Kant. …

 

—Before moving on to analyse the terms of the opposition of the ‘classical’ to the ‘romantic’ in Stephen’s aesthetic theory (between Stephen Hero and Portrait), and the parallel that I’ll argue that this establishes (reveals, rather) between Joyce and Nietzsche, T.E. Hulme and neo-classical Modernism, I want to pause (briefly) here to recapitulate the substance of my reading of Kant and of the nature of the transcendental, linking this more explicitly to my reading of the terms of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics *(—in ‘*“purgation” and the Dionysian sublime’). …

 

This will allow me (I hope) to go at least some of the way toward clarifying and substantiating the (what Nietzsche, and, following him, Joyce and Hulme, characterise as problematic) relationship of the ‘romantic’, and of Romanticism, to the transcendental. *(—maintaining the capitalisation when referring to the artists and movement-period now, somewhat problematically it must be admitted, identified as Romantic, in distinction to the term’s use by Joyce, Nietzsche and Hulme, for which I’ll maintain the lower case and quotation marks here…).

 

*… That is,—I’ll seek here, by way of introduction, to clarify what I’ve already (somewhat pre-emptively) called the rejection of ‘Platonic ressentiment’ in Stephen’s aesthetic theory, and, thus, to contextualise the philosophical stakes in-of the image and the ‘classical’ as I’m going to seek to lay these out here.

 

 

*And so. … (—to recapitulate)…

 

Schopenhauer followed Kant in distinguishing between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself:

*—‘Kant’s greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, based on the proof that between things and us always stands the intellect, and that on this account they cannot be known according to what they may be in themselves.’ (‘Appendix: Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy’ in Schopenhauer, WWR, I, 413-534 (417-418)).

 

 

*—For Kant, all that can be known of an object is that which appears within the limits of the human intuition of space and time. *(—on this, see Jacquette, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, 19).

 

Space and time constitute the appearance’s form: allowing the manifold of appearance to be ordered according to certain relations.

 

They are a priori: constituting the very condition of the possibility of the realm of appearance and sensible knowledge, but have no meaning if applied beyond it.

 

*—They are transcendental.

 

 

—For Kant, the thing-in-itself is conditioned by neither space nor time.

 

Our understanding cannot transcend the limits of sensibility and therefore we can attain no knowledge of things as they are in themselves. *(—Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 30/B 45. Cf. 85 A 45/B 62 (—on the ‘transcendental object’), and also A 128. And, again,—see Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary— esp. 79-80 and 393).

 

*—That which is not an appearance cannot be an object of experience.

 

*—For Kant, experience remains (and must remain) on this side of the transcendental.

 

 

*In his division of the world into ‘will’ and ‘representation’, Schopenhauer retains Kant’s distinction of the thing-in-itself and the appearance.

 

However, he refutes the method by which, he argues, Kant arrives at his deduction of the thing-in-itself.

 

Kant refutes what he argues is ‘the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears’. *(Critique of Pure Reason, B 27).

 

… —In the criticism of Kant which he appended to The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer accuses Kant of contradicting his own idealist distinction, by claiming that the thing-in-itself has an objective foundation,—independent of subjective representation.

 

He argues that Kant reached his account of the thing-in-itself via an erroneous application of the law of causality: that empirical perception and, more fundamentally, sensation, from which the former arises, must have an external (that is, an objective) cause.

 

*In contrast, Schopenhauer emphasises what he argues is the subjective foundation, of causality, and of empirical perception. (—Schopenhauer, 435-436)

 

 

Opposing what he claims is Kant’s attempt to locate the objective foundation of the thing-in-itself, Schopenhauer seeks to derive his own conception from the introduction of the element of self-consciousness… —

 

[Self-consciousness is a] knowledge which everyone possesses directly in the concrete, namely as feeling. This is the knowledge that the inner nature of his own phenomenon, which manifests itself to him as representation both through his actions and through the permanent substratum of these his body, is his will. This will constitutes what is most immediate in his consciousness, but as such it has not wholly entered into the form of the representation, in which object and subject stand over and against each other. (109)

 

Schopenhauer argues that the thing-in-itself lies on the side of the subjective.

 

—The body is that of which the subject is most immediately aware.

 

It represents, for Schopenhauer, the manifestation of the subject’s own ‘inner nature’ (—? h-mm. …), but is also, and at the same time, an object for-to the subject.

 

As both subject and object, it thus constitutes (for Schopenhauer) the most immediate form of representation.

 

—Through the body, Schopenhauer argues, the subject becomes aware of their ‘inner nature’: the force which precipitates their actions. *(—See Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, 137: ‘The movements of the material object which is my body are known to me not only through external sense, as are the movements of other material objects, but also directly, non-sensorily, non-intellectually from within, as acts of will’, and also Jacquette, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer,—73-74).

 

As this precedes, and is the source of consciousness of the body and its actions, and therefore of the relationship of the subject and the object, for Schopenhauer it must thus exist prior to and outside of representation.

 

He argues that the consciousness of this ‘inner nature’ of the subject’s ‘will’, known both directly and indirectly, can be extended to phenomena known only indirectly,—as representations. …

 

As such, it becomes, for him (at least), the ‘key to the knowledge of the innermost being of the whole of nature.’ (109)

 

This, he argues, allows him to extend his understanding of the ‘will’ (—as the motive ‘force’ underlying subjectivity), to all vegetable and animate life, as well as mineral development and phenomena such as electro-magnetism and gravitation,… —all of which he thus portrays as phenomenal expressions of  a unified and universal (inchoate) striving ‘force’.

 

 

—In contrast to Kant’s attempt to locate its foundation in objectivity, Schopenhauer extends his analysis of the subjective ‘will’ to the thing-in-itself.

 

He argues that the willing of which the subject is conscious is the most immediate and adequate phenomenal expression of the noumenal. As such, he adopts the name of the subjective phenomena of the will in order to name the thing-in-itself.

 

*—The ‘will’ is then, for Schopenhauer, the ‘magic word’ (hmm) that reveals ‘the innermost essence of everything in nature’. (111)

 

 

As I argued in *‘“purgation” and the Dionysian sublime’, Schopenhauer’s aesthetics are grounded in an appropriation of philosophical concepts, not only from Kant’s philosophy, but from that of Plato. …

 

 

*—The third book of The World as Will and Representation is dedicated to his analysis of the Platonic Idea as the (proper) object of art. …

 

—In particular, he appropriates, and attempts to marry, the Kantian ‘thing-in-itself’ and the Platonic ‘Idea’. …

—‘we find […] those two great and obscure paradoxes of the two greatest philosophers of the West—to be, not exactly identical, but yet very closely related, and distinguished by only a single modification.’ (WWR, I, §31, 170) …

 

*As I’ve argued,… —as far as Schopenhauer is concerned, the ‘will’ (the—Will) is the thing-in-itself. …

 

—Following Kant, he argues that time, space and causality *(—the principle of sufficient reason), are the forms of our knowledge, which is knowledge only of the phenomenal realm, constituted by ‘plurality and all arising and passing away,’ to which the thing-in-itself (—the Will) is not subject. (171) …

 

Schopenhauer uses his refutation of Kant’s claim to the objectivity of the thing-in-itself to draw a distinction (—his ‘modification’…) between the thing-in-itself and the (‘Platonic’) Idea. …

 

—He argues that, for Plato, the phenomenal realm represents the realm of becoming.

 

*That is,… —The objects of the phenomenal realm (for Schopenhauer) can be considered only as the imperfect shadow copies of the ‘real’ ‘archetypes’ of the Ideas, which ‘always are but never become and never pass away’ and are thus not subject to time, space and causality. (Ibid.)

 

Schopenhauer argues that, for Plato, The Idea is nevertheless ‘necessarily object’,—‘something known, a representation’, and not the thing-in-itself. (Ibid.)

 

 

*—The Idea, then,—as Schopenhauer appropriates and deploys the ‘Platonic’ term-concept *(and I’m being careful, as I was in my reading of Yeats and Plato, to maintain the quotation marks here)—represents the level, or grade, of the will’s most immediate objectivity. …

 

—It’s not subject to the principle of sufficient reason, and is, therefore, independent of the ‘subordinate forms of the phenomenon’. (175—emphasis added.) …

 

However,—‘it has retained the first and most universal form, namely that of representation in general’,… *—‘that of being object for a subject.’ (Ibid.)

 

 

*—The phenomenon, for Schopenhauer, can only ever constitute the indirect objectification of the will. …

 

*… —(In-)between, then, the phenomenon and the will, stands the Idea—‘as the only direct objectivity of the will.’ (Ibid.—and, again,—emphasis added here).

 

 

*The Idea, under the aegis of Schopenhauer’s self-styled Kantian-Platonic conjunction (synthesis), represents ‘the most adequate objectivity possible of the will or of the thing-in-itself; indeed it is even the whole thing-in-itself, only under the form of the representation’, of which the (spatiotemporal) representations are only so many plural copies,—‘multiplying the Idea in particular and fleeting individuals’. (175)

 

 

*Schopenhauer argues that it’s possible to be raised from knowledge of particular things to knowledge of the Ideas through a change in the subject’s apprehension of the object: —from its imperfect extension in(to) space and time, to its timeless Idea. …

 

In order to attain to knowledge of the Ideas, the elevation of the object,—from (mere) representation to the Idea, must be accompanied (—must be matched) by a corresponding elevation of the subject,—above (mere)—individuality. (§33, 176) …

 

—And this,—elevation, consists, for Schopenhauer, in the tearing free of knowledge from service to the striving, suffering and interestedness of the will…

*—‘we no longer consider the where, the when, the why and whither in things, but simply and solely the what.’ (§34, 178)

 

And this elevation occurs (according to Schopenhauer) in—*aesthetic contemplation. …

 

 

*—In aesthetic contemplation, then,… —just as the object is no longer the particular, individuated spatiotemporal object, but (instead)—the ‘eternal form’ of the Idea,… —the subject is no longer (simply) an individual, and ‘[w]e lose ourselves entirely in this object’. …

 

*—The subject becomes *the ‘pure will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge.’ (-179)

 

 

And, for Schopenhauer, the type of knowledge (so to) which continues to exist outside and independent of phenomenal objectivity and individual subjectivity is *‘art

*(—‘the work of genius’. …) (—§36, 184) …

 

*… —Art ‘repeats’ the Idea, apprehended through pure contemplation.

*(and, again,… —for readings of Schopenhauer’s use of the Platonic Forms or Ideas and their place in his aesthetics, the reader is advised here to consult Julian Young, Schopenhauer, 77-78, 129-134, and Jacquette, ‘Introduction’ (8-9) and Paul Guyer, ‘Pleasure and Knowledge in Schopenhauer’s Aesthetics’, in Jacquette, ed., Schopenhauer, Philosophy, and the Arts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 109-132 (109).

 

 *            *            *

 

 

So then, …

 

—Kant seeks to outline the impossibility of gaining access to (and beyond) the transcendental

*(—the a priori.—the very condition of the possibility of experience. …).

 

 

—Schopenhauer, then, in his metaphysics and aesthetics,… in effect seeks-attempts to over-leap (so to—sic) Kant,… —the bounds of experience and of the transcendental—in naming (and in claiming knowledge of) the thing-in-itself, and in seeking to define art as granting a form of access to the—‘eternal’, immutable,… transcendental—(‘Platonic’) Ideas…

*(—In ‘early Nietzsche vs. Schopenhauer’, I presented my reading of the terms of Nietzsche’s rejection of Schopenhauer, and what (the young) ol’ Fritz saw as the Schopenhauer’s attempt, in-and-through his conception of the ‘Will’ (—single, self-identical, metaphysical), to drape the thing-in-itself in the vestiture of the appearance(-representation). …).

 

*… —And I want to argue here that it’s this—Schopenhauer’s (attempted-staged) over-leaping of Kant and of the limits of the transcendental through his conceptions of the ‘Will’ (as thing-in-itself) and, more particularly, the Idea—which is at stake in Romanticism and the Romantic conception of art (—bearing in mind that Schopenhauer represents one of the most obvious and direct inheritors of the Romantic tradition…). …

 

*That is. … —In (or for) Romanticism and, by extension, the ‘romantic’, as it will be cast in Joyce, Nietzsche, and Hulme,—artistic inspiration grants the artist a form of access to (or—beyond) the transcendental (—to the ‘Idea’) (—as I’ve Yeats, and this will be seen to be true, in the sequel, also of Shelley—as a sort of Romantic model (that is,—a model for the Romantic conception of artistic inspiration) here…).

 

 

*In their translator’s introduction to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s brilliant text on ‘philosophy’ and ‘literature’ in the early period of the ‘romantic’ movement (—the Jena frühromantik),—The Literary Absolute, Barnard and Lester clearly and lucidly summarise the authors’ reading of the ‘romantics’ attempt to move beyond Kant (and, by extension—to exceed the limits of the transcendental). … —

 

Following this genuinely radical insistence on the incompatibility of sensible presentation and the ideas of pure reason, on the impossibility of an adequate presentation of ideas, Kant’s successors in idealism and romanticism, albeit in quite distinct but ultimately related ways […] will reinvest the concept of presentation in such a way as to transform it into the kind of adequate and ever more perfect operation they perceive to be lacking in Kant.

[… —]

In the romantic theory of literature and art, what is perceived as both the dead end and the most formidable challenge of the Kantian of presentation is transformed into a model of art as the aesthetic activity of production and formation in which the absolute might be experienced and realized in an unmediated, immediate fashion […] a presentation of what in Kant remained unpresentable.

*(—Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism, trans. Phillip Barnard and Cheryl Lester [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988].—ix.).

 

hmm.

 

*… —‘ in which the *absolute might be experienced and realized in an unmediated, immediate fashion’.

 

 

*—And it’s precisely this claim—to the transcendental,—to the absolute,—to the ‘sensible actualisation of the Idea in the realm of the aesthetic’ (Ibid.—emphases added here…), that, in their definition and championing of the ‘classical’ over (and against) the ‘romantic’, Nietzsche and the self-styled neo-classical Modernists, I will argue, seek to reject

*(here: —under the rubric of Joyce’s/a ‘Joycean’ realism, Nietzsche’s conception of the structure of ressentiment, and Hulme’s rejection of a ‘Rousseauan’, Humanist politics in particular. …).

 

… —Rejecting the (supposéd) exceeding of experience (—that experience has, as yet, indeed been something known,… —been known well enough (—an exhaustive knowledge-knowing),… —has indeed been something whole, controlled, and self-identical that it could be ‘exceeded’ …),—the exceeding of (the limits of) the transcendental *(—to the perfect, immutable, unchangeable Idea, if not so far as the thing-in-itself (=X)…).

 

(… —Building, then, on my conception of the fold in the ironic self-(re-)creation of the artist in Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy, and on the notion of a sudden and uncanny ironic inversion in-of quotidian experience in the ‘epiphany’–the image in Stephen’s aesthetic theory between Stephen Hero and Portrait. …)

 

*—toward a disruptive, anti-transcendental ‘classicism’.

 

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3 thoughts on “*—toward the concept of a disruptive, anti-transcendental ‘classicism’. (‘*on the Becoming Actual of the Being of Beauty’ part (iii). & ‘*a paean’ part (ii). …)

  1. […] image’), ‘a paean’, ‘the image.—vs. Platonic ressentiment’, and ‘—toward a disruptive, anti-transcendental “classicism”’. […]

  2. […] —follows on from *‘the image.—vs. Platonic ressentiment’, *‘—toward a disruptive, anti-transcendental “classicism”’, and *‘—the “classical”.—vs. the “romantic” (in Joyce, Nietzsche, and Hulme.)’ […]

  3. […] —follows on from *‘the image.—vs. Platonic ressentiment’, ‘—toward a disruptive, anti-transcendental “classicism”’, *‘the “classical”.—vs. the “romantic” (in Joyce, Nietzsche, and Hulme.)’, and […]

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