*the ‘frozen’,… —as opposition to the turbulence of movement. … —on the origins *(—the… precipitation) of the ‘mirror stage’. …

*(—a reading group).

Why Lacan & why the real… —? —Introduction to the reading group.

Introduction to Lacan: notes from a lecture.

Outline of a reading of ‘The Mirror Stage’.

Mirror Stage I.—the infant, the mirror, & the nature of the image.

Mirror Stage II.—‘space fear’, & the ‘ideal’. (part (i).)

Mirror Stage II.—‘space fear’, & the ‘ideal’. (part (ii).): Nietzsche on the intellect, language, the ‘I’ as fiction, and ‘intuition’.

Mirror Stage II.—‘space fear’, & the ‘ideal’. (part (iii).): the Undivided Continuity of States. —‘analysis’, ‘duration’ & ‘intuition’ in Bergson.

Mirror Stage II.—‘space fear’, & the ‘ideal’. (part (iv).): language, ‘intuition’ & flux in Nietzsche & Bergson, & the fiction of the ‘I’ in Lacan.


*the ‘frozen’,… —as opposition to the turbulence of movement.
(—on the origins *(—the… precipitation) of the ‘mirror stage’). …

[…] *freezes it and in a symmetry that reverses it, in opposition to the *|turbulent movements| with which the subject feels he *animates it.
*(Lacan, ‘The Mirror Stage’, 76).


The desire for identity, I have argued, is spurred by a more primary (so to) desire,… —a need,… —an unrealistic and (ultimately-finally) unrealisable hope,—for fixity *(—stasis). …



*—‘freezing’ turbulent’ movements (repress) beneath apparent… discretion of the form—the ‘contour’—of the ‘I’


*… —The mirror stage represents an attempt to wrest (the fiction of a) fixity-stasis (—peace and security) from the chaos of an underlying flux of movements of and within the subject (—psychological and bodily), and in(-within) its environment (surrounds-environs).



*It’s possible, then, to read (—to give an account-a reading, here, of) the origins of the ‘mirror stage’.



—In laying out this reading-account of the origins, and of the structure of the mirror stage,… I want to draw, in particular, on a key idea from the work of the Modernist critic, poet, and aesthete T.E. Hulme,… —an idea which he himself adopts(-appropriates) from the work of Wilhelm Worringer: …


*… —I want to examine the origins of the ‘mirror stage’—in-as a response to, following Hulme and Worringer, I’ll characterise here as


*—‘space fear’.



*(—I’ll adapt-be adapting here, some material from my doctoral thesis, as well as some material which I wrote (from the point-of-view (so to) of my protagonist) for my first novel: Notes of a Vanishing Quantity *(—which I’m still trying, and failing, to publish, and which my thesis and its adaptation in this blog, are intended as a kind of a… companion piece), and which I earlier adapted for the blog of an ‘early C20th political writing’ reading group of which I was a part, under the title of: towards an Ethics of Friendship. …


*—The material from ‘Ethics’…  places my own spin on ‘space fear’,… reading it (implicitly-by implication) with, or in terms of Nietzsche, Bergson, and Hulme on language and flux, and Nietzsche’s later doctrine of the ‘will to power’ *(—for my reading of the ‘will to power’, see elsewhere on this blog).




on the ‘geometric’. …
—at the root (—the necessity) of art in Hulme & Worringer. …

In his account of artistic inspiration in the later ‘Modern Art and Its Philosophy’ (—a lecture to the Quest Society, London, 22nd January 1914), Modernist poet and art critic T.E. Hulme appropriates Wilhelm Worringer’s concept of ‘space-shyness’… —

The fear I mean here is mental, however, not physical […] *a kind of space-shynessin the face of the varied confusion and arbitrariness of existence. In art this state of mind results in *a desire to create a certain *|abstract geometrical shape|, which, being durable and permanent shall be a refuge from the *flux and impermanence of *outside nature.


In the reproduction of natural objects there is an attempt to *purify them of their characteristically living qualities in order to make them necessary and immovable. *The changing is translated into something fixed and necessary.

*(—in T.E, Hulme, Speculations: Essays on Humanism and the Philosophy of Art, ed. Herbert Read, with a Frontispiece and Foreword by Jacob Epstein (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.; 1924)86)


For Hulme, in contrast to ‘vital’ art, which is inspired by a ‘delight in the forms of nature’,… —artistic inspiration in ‘geometric’ art *(—functioning here as a kind of pseudonym, I’d argue, for Hulme’s own conception of ‘classical’ art, which I won’t go into here… ) stems from a state of fear of the confused and arbitrary—the inchoate—flux of the phenomena of ‘outside nature’. …


*—This… ‘space-fear’ gives birth to a desire to imbue the flux of external phenomena with a static form, or ‘shape’.


Just as ‘vital’ art, for Hulme, ‘geometric’ art still aims at the reproduction of natural objects. …


However,… *—in ‘geometric’ art this reproduction aims to ‘purify’ phenomena, sloughing off all that is contingent in them, and drawing out all that is ‘necessary’, imbuing them with permanence and redeeming experience from its contingency.


Hulme’s terms are a verbatim repetition of those of Worringer. …

*—In a passage which I love… —I think it’s stunningly astute, and uncannily accurate, on the psychology of the motivation to write—to attempt to create art… —Worringer identifies ‘an immense spiritual dread of space’ at *‘the root of artistic creation’ in what he calls ‘the urge to abstraction’.

*(—Wilhelm Worringer, Abstraction and Empathy: A Contribution to the Psychology of Style, trans. Michael Bullock [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1953],—15)… —

[It is] because he [the artist of ‘abstraction’/—the abstract artist… ] stands so lost and spiritually helpless *amidst |the things of the external world|, because he experiences only obscurity and caprice in the inter-connection and flux of the phenomena of the external world, that the *urge is strong in him to *divest the things of the external world of their caprice and obscurity in the world-picture and to *impart to them a value of necessity and value of regularity. *(—18)

Worringer distinguishes this ‘fear’ in the *‘urge to abstraction’ from the *‘urge to empathy’, which, he argues, represents— *‘a happy pantheistic relationship of confidence between man and the phenomena of the external world.’ (15)


(hmm). …



Hulme first refers to this ‘fear’ (—agoraphobic) in ‘A Lecture on Modern Poetry’ (—c.1908). …


In this earlier piece, however, he relegates it to the sole possession of the ‘ancients’ and distinguishes the relativity and rejection of ‘absolute truth’ characteristic of the ‘modern spirit’. (—see T.E. Hulme: Selected Writings, ed., Patrick McGuinness, (Manchester: Carcanet Press, 1998), 59-67 [62-63])


—It’s not until the later piece that he fully incorporates Worringer’s conception of ‘space-fear’ into his own definition of the ‘classical’ and modern art.

*(—see Helen Carr ‘T.E. Hulme and the “Spiritual Dread of Space”’ in Edward P. Comentale and Andrzej Gasiorck, ed., T.E. Hulme and the Question of Modernism [—Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate, 2006,—93-112 *[—esp. 103]). …



*… —to retrieve (redeem)—to save—experience, then,… —from the sense of its being inessential and lost.—without meaning or (necessary) consequence.


—without purpose or import.


—arbitrary, floating and haphazard.


*—infinitely replaceable.

(—nothing substantial, nothing essential, nothing that stands). …


—to redeem experience from the overwhelming mass—the flux—of forces (—events, possibilities, obligations-demands, desires, anxieties…), uncontrollable and vast.

(—a resentment of…).






Hulme appropriates what he sees-defines as Worringer’s insight into what lies at the very *root of art. …




—that, at ‘the root of artistic creation’, lies ‘an immense spiritual dread of space’.

(against, what Worringer calls, the ‘urge to empathy’: that ‘happy pantheistic relationship of confidence between man and the phenomena of the external world’.)


—gives rise (birth) to the (artistic) ‘urge to abstraction’:

Hulme-Worringer (CLUSTER)


—the fear of the (apparent) vastness of space (paradoxical as it might nonetheless seem) is in fact revealed as a fear-resentment of (life’s)smallness.


—to be overwhelmed in the face of the vastness—the vast expanse of forces (felt) in the external world, that run counter to the will—to the willed

(would will, if could.).




fear.—of an incapacity to control.—a resentment of the smallness of the lived.

(frustration the incapacity to exceed the limits of circumstance circumscribed, and realise the potential-desired, felt).


to be caught (inescapably) in-within the smallness of what must be lived (circumstance) at the cost of the all-else that could (—that ought?) to be lived.


—to fix the lived (—the impression) in a fixed form. in a form which makes (which renders) it necessary.


—to record the impression—atomically (—faithfully).find (to use) the precise—exact—words.




qualification of (the expression of) the impression.—precision-accuracy

(full—complete—honesty/accuracy.—as honest as can). …


—and slough off the inessential


to fix the core of the experience and render it sharp, hard and precise (‘geometric’).—to give it a shape.


make the lived necessary.—by virtue of its being a form

(existence—having existed-lived—become necessary to the creation of the form and become necessary through its own embodiment within—imbued with—the form).



to redeem (to show—to reveal—the already redemption of) the lived, in-by recognition.—of the work (—the image).—of the attempt to articulate the intuition.


recognition (approbation?).—to be recognised.


need.—to have the sense of an intuition recognised.


something worthy of being communicated (—set down).


recognition of the need (the compulsion) to set it down.


to create a solid, stable object that demonstrates the necessity of experience. makes experience-the lived necessary to itself,—to its own creation.


a yearning (—an ache) to realise and to communicate and to have that feeling-sense be recognised (and be shared-requited).


to be recognised as self in another-others and reflected.


to be known (and to be loved).


in-between space-fear, then, and the desire (the need) for recognition


—the fiction of the ‘thing’(—the ‘self’). …

an art of reading. …


—of the structure (—the shape) of the impression-impressions.


… —of the forces.—physical: movements, pressures.—of the senses: light, colour, touch, smell, sound… —of the emotional.—of connections in-of memorial-remembered (memories—conjured up, so to).


—of the competing impulses of which the impression is comprised-composed.—their arrangement, their relation to one another and their (relativeprominence.


in any given moment.


—all urges. drives. impulses.


and all compete (struggle) for balance, for clarity, for order,for dominance.


and the balance-order, at any one given moment, is what decides what am (to be).


—the ‘self’.



*—the ‘self’ (the… sense of ‘self’), then, as a fiction. …


—the result (the end) of a process of struggle (negotiation) of—between—drives and forces.


—the name (retrospective)-naming, thus, of the arrangement—the hierarchy—of forces.


in (within) an organism.


an imposition of language


imposed on flux


—a multiplicity of forces (of sub-wills).


projection.—a fiction of unity projected onto the flux of forces.


—language (linguistic).


—the origin and the history of a ‘thing’ (of any given thing): first, a projection—projecting back name—onto an arrangement-heirarchy of forces.


and second—a forgetting of (that act of) projection (that act of creation).


the name—the forged thing—taken to be (thereal.

(because—for Nietzsche, following Kant… —all that we can have access to and thus have knowledge of are the objects of everyday experience. because we cannot think outside the limits of our senses, we take those objects of experience to be real—in-themselves. … ).


any ‘thing’ in existence, then, has (must have)—come about


—as the result of a continuing process of naming (—names).


—a continual (continued,—continuing) process of being (having beeninterpreted.


—from the retrospective imposition of a unity (—of unities) upon the flux that flows always (anywaybeneath.

(—beneath the names).


upon the flux of forces.


—upon a (any given) quantum of reality


—always being appropriated and (re-)transformed…


—continually being undone and remade (—re-named).—re-forged


appropriated by (—linguistic) forces. overpowered.


—from without.


—the history, then, of any (given) ‘thing’, then, is a chain of signs (of names, of naming…).


always unfolding.


—a history, then, of *interpretations….


*—of adaptations. …


not (no, never) a progress-thus progressive.

(—no ‘goal’,—no ‘end’).


only ever a series (—a succession) of—mutually independent—processes.


—of appropriation.


of adaptation. …


exacted on the (given) quantum of reality.

(—of resistances, then, and of overpowerings).



*… —the form and the meaning of a ‘thing’ (—of any given thing), then, is fluid (always)


as in the process of the formation of language.


first: the stimulus of sense-sense-stimulus.

(a sight, a sound, a scent.—an impression)…


transposed-translated into a word (—sound).—from a need (felt) to discharge the (physical-physiological,—psychological) reaction to the stimulus.

(the word as a metaphor—as first metaphor—for the stimulus felt).


when many such similar impressions are yoked together (—grouped), under the aegis of a single word, that word becomes a concept.


—a name for a group—a cluster—of experiences (impressions), which serves to yoke them all together according to the similarities that they share.

(and must overlook—must elide—all the differences between them.


—crude (unsubtle)…).


the concept.—second metaphor.

(at two removes, then, from the sense-stimulus which gives birth-rise to it).


—the formation of the concept of the ‘leaf’…


—formed by discarding the differences between all (of those) individual leaves.

(—awakens the idea that, in addition to all those individual, incompatible, leaves, there exists—in nature (somehow, somewhere)—some ür,—some ideal ‘leaf’,—from which, in some way-fashion, all those other leaves,—descend


the (Platonic) Idea(-Form). …).


—‘analysis’ (—to borrow ol’ Bergson’s term). …


*—breaks down—fragments—its subject (—the flux) into parts-thus elements (—‘things’).—all made to participate with other fragmented elements in-under—pre-existing—concepts.


the break down (—breaking down) of-in-within ‘analysis’… *—art (after a fashion). …



—in the forgetting of that (act of) art (—creation)—the (mistaken) taking of the fragment-‘thing’ as-for a thing-in-itself (—as-for the real. ).


—the ‘self’, then.—a word. …

(—a name.—an ideal thus.—impossible to hold to,—impossible to attain identity with.—thrust upon on, thus,  from without,—in linguistic…).




beneath the veneer, then, of (supposéd) ‘things’ (—of what we come to think of, then, as ‘experience’).—beneath the membrane (the skein) of artificial fragmented atoms—of ‘things’ in-of conceptual space, and of ‘moments’ in conceptual time—there subsists a foundation (—a substrate) of undifferentiated ‘states’.


—the flux of an undivided continuity of ‘states’.


—apparently mutually exclusive and autonomous, these ‘states’ thus nonetheless interpenetrate, enfolding (down, within themselves) all the states which led-up-to (preceded) their emergence, and, again, unfolding, ineluctably, into all those states which are to (must) follow (in the future yet). …


—forming, then, (justone reality, nonetheless, however paradoxical it may seem, comprised of this continual flux of successive ‘states’.


after a time, through habitual use (—familiarity)—convention—the concept (concepts) become empty—flat and stale—and elide (ignore) the details and the variations (—the engine of the difference) between things.


—no longer maintain any connection to the sense-stimulus from which they originally evolved-arose (no use value any more.—no connection to the quanta they were born to name—to which they, in effect, gave birth).





*on Lacan, then, & ‘space fear’ (—the ‘geometric’ … ). …

*Before the establishment of relations-relationships between the subject (—through the ego = “I”) and-to a world of discrete ‘things’… … *—the (‘Nietzschean’-‘Bergsonian’, so to) flux—of an undivided continuity of ‘states’. …


—In the face of which—in response to which—the subject feels (of necessity), then,—overwhelmed… —imperilled (threatened). …


—experiences *‘space fear’ (agoraphobic). …

[The abstract artist/artist of ‘abstraction’… ] experiences only obscurity and caprice in the inter-connection and flux of the phenomena of the external world, that the *urge is strong in him to *divest the things of the external world of their caprice and obscurity in the world-picture and to *impart to them a value of necessity and value of regularity. (Worringer, Abstraction and Empathy,—18)


—In response to ‘space fear’ (—agoraphobia)… *(… —no way to engage with-to relate to ‘outside nature’. … —no way to defend against-fend off the peril in-of chaotic flux), then,… —a necessity (felt)—an *urge—… to impart discretion upon the otherwise fearful, inchoate flux. …


*—the imposition of language. …


… —selection. … the selective culling of forces, impulses,… of—detail, from flux: highlighting—bounding round, with (an only ever apparent) contour, of some,… —the  elision or suppression of others. …

*—the creation of the fiction—the artistic projection—of ‘thinghood’ *(so to—in space, and in-of time),…


*—the creation of the fiction of the ‘I’. …


*—the divestiture of caprice, and the imparting of discretion (stasis). …



*Lacan,… and the ‘frozen’ (—‘freezes’) as opposition to ‘tubulent movements’ *(—the turbulent movements in-of the flux of the organism. … ).



—that which underpins (so to) and precipitates ‘the mirror stage’—


…—a… response


—an attempted ‘geometric’ (—the form-formal outline—contour—of the image of the body… —appropriated in-to (the artistic fictional projection of) the “I”) remedy for, the desire-need (felt) for fixity-stasis,…


*—the-a fear (—agoraphobic) of space, and of flux. …



*The ‘mirror stage’, then, as—the appropriation, or the… pulling, of the non-/pre-egoistic subject (so to—sic?) into extant (pre-existing) orders/structures (—the legislation, in early-Nietzschean terms) of language.


*as *(—the formation of)— *the I that says “I”. …


*—the ‘ideal I’.



I want to move on now, then,—to examine the nature of that ‘ideal’ (there) in more detail, and the way in which (I think) it can provide a hook into thinking about the *‘real’… —ontology in Lacan *(—Lacan’s ‘ontology’ … ), and can serve to qualify some of the ideas I developed in my readings of Nietzsche and Bergson on language and the nature of flux. …



*concluding early Nietzsche vs. Schopenhauer, & Nietzsche, Bergson, language & intuition… * – the will to power. …

*(follows on from ‘On the “Undivided Continuity of States”.’ …).


*conclusion to part I. …
*—on the will to power. …


*The origin of the emergence of a thing […] anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it; […] everything that occurs in the organic world consists of overpowering, dominating, and in their turn, overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former “meaning” [Sinn] and “purpose” must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated.[…T]he whole history of a “thing”, an organ, a tradition can to this extent be a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new interpretations and adaptations [….] The “development” of a thing, a tradition, an organ is therefore not its progressus towards a goal, still less is it a logical progressus, taking the shortest route with the least expenditure of energy and cost, – instead it is a succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of subjugation exacted on the thing, added to this the resistances encountered every time, the attempted transformations for the purpose of defence and reaction, and the results, too, of successful countermeasures. The form is fluid, the “meaning” [Sinn] even more so…

*(Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, trans Carol Diethe, ed Keith Ansell-
Pearson [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003], *—II, §12, 55).


*so,—… (hmm). … —I want to try to conclude this current chapter *(—this thread or string of fragments, here) by moving on to argue that understanding the ‘primal unity’ (the—Ur-Eine) of Birth as representing the ‘eternally suffering and contradictory’ interpenetrating flux of natural drives, as I established this reading in my comparison of Nietzsche and Bergson, places it in far closer proximity to Nietzsche’s later doctrine of the ‘will to power’, than to the (metaphysical) unity of the Schopenhauerian ‘will’ (—Will). …

—This will (it is hoped) help to clarify the anti-metaphysics and naturalism I will argue are at stake in Birth, and (also,—by extension) my reading of Nietzsche’s account of artistic inspiration and creation in the text. …


—I want to understand  the ‘will to power’ here in terms of Gilles Deleuze’s reading in Nietzsche and Philosophy, in contrast to that of Rüdiger Bittner (—the editor of Cambridge Press’s recent excellent edition of ol’ Fritz’s later notebooks), who argues that the ‘will to power’ is analogous (in some way) to Schopenhauer’s ‘will’ (—Will…).[1]


—In his introduction to Nietzsche’s late notebooks, Bittner claims that ‘[a]s far as its scope is concerned, Nietzsche’s “will to power” simply takes over the place of Schopenhauer’s “will”’, citing Schopenhauer’s claim that ‘it is one and the same will that manifests itself both in the forces of inorganic and the forms of organic nature.’[2]

As such, I would argue, Bittner presupposes the unity, or the—self-identity of the ‘will’ in Nietzsche’s formulation of the will to power. …

—This prejudice leads him to make the mistake, I think, of misreading the formulation, arguing that:

—‘the “will to power” does mean “will for power”: a will to power is a will such as the thing willed is power.’ (LN, xvii.—emphases added here…)


so then,…

—Bittner reasons from a falsely assumed original unity of the will to the conclusion that it must be this unitary will which wills for power’. …

*(—Nietzsche’s/the Nietzschean ‘will’, then, (for Bittner), represents a metaphysical unity… —a singular, self-identical, Will, which wills for its own—‘power’. …).


He concludes his reading of the will to power as follows:

‘While it is a defect that the present reading makes the doctrine of will to power come out false, it is not a decisive one: I see no reading intelligible in itself and reasonably true to the texts that does better.’ (xxii)

—Such a reading is, in fact, offered by Deleuze. …


*—In his analysis of the concept of ‘genealogy,’ ‘sense’, and the philosophy of the will in Nietzsche, Deleuze defines the ‘sense’ of a ‘thing’ as ‘the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it.’[3]

—For Deleuze (following Nietzsche), the sense of a ‘thing’ (—an event, phenomenon, word or thought) is generated by the accession to dominance of a particular ‘force’ which had been vying for that dominance with rival forces:

*theappropriation, then, of a quantum of reality. … (3-4 (see also 29).—cf. OGM, II, §11, 55). …

—‘The history of a thing’, then (my emph.), expresses—‘the succession of forces which take possession of it and the co-existence of the forces which struggle for possession. The same object, the same phenomenon, changes sense depending on the force which appropriates it.’ (3)

And this precludes any notion of the ‘thing’s’ unity or self-identity…


For Nietzsche, Deleuze argues, a thing’s ‘essence’ (so to) would constitute ‘that one among all the senses of a thing, which gives it the force with which it has most affinity.’ (4)

‘Essence’ is that which allows the thing to go to the ends of what it is capable of achieving and does not serve to inhibit or debilitate it, and is neither a priori nor integral to the thing. …

With this conception of force, Deleuze argues, ‘Nietzsche substitutes the correlation of sense and phenomenon for the metaphysical duality of appearance and essence.’ (3)

—In opposition to a Kantian-Schopenhauerian metaphysical distinction between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, Nietzsche posits a conception of a flux of natural forces.—The ‘sense’ of a thing names its possession by a dominant force at any one point or moment in time, and its ‘history’ names the succession of such possessions through time. …


—Against Bittner’s misreading of a unified, Schopenhauerian, metaphysical Will—the metaphysical unity of the ‘will for power’—according to the terms of Deleuze’s reading (which itself, as I have suggested, closely follows Fritz’s formulation in OGM), ‘Nietzsche’s concept of force is therefore that of a force which is related to another force: in this form force is called will. The will (will to power) is the differential element of force’.[4]

—The will to power, according to the terms of Deleuze’s reading then, represents the ‘differential element’ between the natural forces (sub-wills) struggling for possession of a quantum of reality.—It serves to define the sense of a thing, by expressing the force which has (however temporarily) triumphed in this struggle, and defines the ‘essence’ of the thing, by identifying with which force the thing has the utmost affinity.

Alongside the false assumption of the unity of the will to power, which he thus identifies as a (Schopenhauerian) ‘source’ of events (—? hmm…), one of Bittner’s crucial mistakes is to fail to define the concept of ‘power’ itself correctly…

—He argues that ‘the doctrine maintains that any living thing does whatever it does for the sake of gaining power or of augmenting the power it already has.’ (LN, xx) He is able to misrepresent the will to power as the ‘intention’ of a ‘living thing’ because he at first assumes the (internal) self-identity of the living thing. In fact, what I have already argued is the case in the imposition of the concepts of the intellect on the pre-individuated flux of natural drives in ‘On Truth’ *(and of the parallel with the fictional status of the ‘I’ and the thing in the late notebooks), and is supported by Deleuze’s reading of force and ‘sense’… —for Nietzsche, the discrete, and (only) apparently self-identical ‘thing’ is, in fact, sculpted (—cut away) from the underlying flux of an undivided continuity of states and/or forces through an (essentially) artistic process of ‘individuation’. …

*(and identity (—thing-hood,—(the) I…) itself, then, is—can only ever be—a retrospective fiction,—projected back, onto (what was, in essence) an arrangement—a hierarchy—of forces. …).

*—The will to power names an overcoming within what will be later dubbed the phenomenon (—the Deleuzian ‘sense’ of the thing)…

Power, and the will to power, name, in the first instance, the, a ‘self’-overcoming (so to), and not the ‘intention’ of a living thing with regard to external phenomena, as Bittner argues.[5]



—As Deleuze argues in his analysis of Nietzsche’s concept of value and evaluation: ‘the value of something is the hierarchy of forces which are expressed in it as a complex phenomenon.’ (7)…

*—the value, then, of any given phenomenon—its will to power—derives as an expression of which force has become dominant within it and which have submitted to this dominance, at any given moment (—at any given point) in-within the arc of that phenomenon…

*(—the retrospective, linguistic, fiction of a given point in-within space,—of an atom in-of-within time,—of the ‘identity’ of the thing (—the ‘I’) itself,… defined by—naming—the succession to dominance of a force and the creation of a hierarchy within a complex of forces constituting a quantum of reality…).

In contrast to the metaphysical unity and myopic struggle ‘for’ power of Bittner’s reading, the Nietzschean ‘will’ is, in fact, a plurality: *—a ‘complex’. …

—As Deleuze argues, this multiplicity and complexity of the ‘will’ is the ‘precise point’ of Nietzsche’s break with Schopenhauerian metaphysics. (cf. 7) …


*So. … —Despite Nietzsche’s own claim (within the text itself) that the ‘primal unity’ represents the fundamental ‘metaphysical assumption’ (—?) underpinning Birth, (—and for this see §4, 45), it in fact names the flux of the multiplicity of natural drives, firmly anti-metaphysical and of the realm of representation, prior to and underlying the process of individuation, alluded to in the ‘On Schopenhauer’ fragment, clearly articulated for the first time in ‘On Truth’ and elevated-raised finally to the level of a philosophical doctrine in the formulation of the will to power. …

—In Birth, metaphysical, Schopenhauerian vocabulary is ironically appropriated to a nascent anti-Schopenhauerian, ‘naturalist’ philosophical project. …


*and so then,… in what is to follow here *(—the next string-thread of fragments—chapter), I will argue that it is this that underpins Nietzsche’s reading of the appropriation of the drive to the incorporation of lived experience into culture in the forms Apollinian art, and the appropriation of the purgation of lived experience and the suppressed energetic reservoir of the natural drives into culture within Dionysian art, and, finally, in the conjunction of these art forms in the fold of the self-creation of the lyric poet, conceived of as the Apollinian incorporation of the experience of Dionysian purgation.

[1] Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone, 1986); Nietzsche, Writings  from the Late Notebooks, (LN) trans. Kate Sturge, ed. Rudiger Bittner (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press: 2003)

[2] LN, xxi.—The translation is Bittner’s own from Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, I, §27, 170. Cf. Payne’s translation: ‘in all the forces of inorganic and in all the forms of organic nature, it is one and the same will that reveals itself’. (in Schopenhauer, WWR, I, §27, 143)

[3] 3. Deleuze takes as the basis of his reading of the ‘will to power’ the passage cited as-in the epigraph to the current section-fragment: OGM, II, §11, 55-56…

[4] 6. Cf. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans.Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), IX, §260, in which,  returning to the definition of the pre-history of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ and the ‘noble’ and ‘base,’ first addressed in Human, All Too Human (HH, I, §45, 36-37), and later more fully developed in the first essay of On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche distinguishes between what he calls the ‘two basic types’ of morality: the master and slave moralities. The former is defined by the nobility of a self-felt prerogative to create and legislate values from an overwhelming feeling of an overfullness or excess of power (cf. 205). The latter is ‘base’: ‘violated, oppressed, suffering, unfree, […] weary’, and from this exhausted, resentful state moralises (cf. 207). Nietzsche argues that in what he emphasises as all ‘higher’ and ‘more mixed  cultures’ there is an ‘interpenetration and mutual misunderstanding of both, and at times they occur directly alongside each other]—even in the same human being, within a single soul.’ (204). This conflict and vying for dominance of the master and slave moralities,—of the active and reactive, supports the Deleuzian reading of the will to power and serves to refute Bittner’s conclusions.

[5] On the importance of the primacy of self-overcoming to the will to power see especially Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, 34[250], 16; 35[15], 18; 36[22], 25; 38[8], 36-37; 1[44], 57; 10[87], 188 and 14[79], 245-246.